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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate socioeconomic heterogeneity in the
eect of unexpected health shocks on labor market outcomes, using
register-based data on the entire population of Swedish workers. We
eectively exploit a Dierence-in-Dierence-in-Dierences design, in
which we compare the change in labor earnings across treated and
control groups with high and low education levels. If the anticipation
eects are similar for individuals with high and low education, any
dierence in the estimates across socioeconomic groups could plau-
sibly be given a causal interpretation. Our results suggest a large
amount of heterogeneity in the eects, in which individuals with a
low education level suer relatively more from a given health shock.
These results hold across a wide range of dierent types of health
shocks and become more pronounced with age. Our results suggest
that socioeconomic heterogeneity in the eect of health shocks oers
one explanation for how the socioeconomic gradient in health arises.
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11 Introduction
The socioeconomic gradient in health is one of the most widely replicated
results in the social sciences. It dates back at least to the nineteenth cen-
tury, when researchers documented marked health dierences across dier-
ent groups in society, such as royalty, the landed-gentry, and the working
class (see Antonovsky (1967) for a review of the early literature on the so-
cioeconomic gradient in health). In modern societies, the gradient is usu-
ally found to widen during working life but then narrows as people reach
older ages (see e.g. van Kippersluis et al. 2009, Case & Deaton 2005b). As
shown in gure 1, this pattern also holds in countries with universal health
insurance coverage and high-quality medical care, such as Sweden.1 The
gure shows the fraction of members of the population in the upper- and
lower-income quartiles at dierent ages stating that they are in bad health.
While there is general agreement about the existence of a socioeconomic
gradient in health, there is little agreement about its underlying causes.
In the epidemiological literature, it has traditionally been assumed that
people's socioeconomic status in terms of income and/or level of education
aects their health. Economists have instead explored the hypothesis that
health outcomes inuence socioeconomic status (e.g. Smith 1998). This
is a very dierent explanation from the traditional one, since it suggests
that health outcomes are the mechanism through which the socioeconomic
gradient partly arises. Surveys by Smith (1999) and Case & Deaton (2005a)
even conclude that a larger part of the association between health and
socioeconomic status in middle age and old age is likely to reect an impact
of health on socioeconomic status.
The recent economics literature has for the most part implicitly assumed
that the impact of a health event on labor market outcomes is similar
across dierent socioeconomic groups of the population.2 This is a rather
restrictive assumption for a number of reasons. First, a large literature
has shown socioeconomic heterogeneity in the recovery from and survival
of medical conditions, such as cancers and heart diseases (e.g. Schrijvers &
Mackenbach 1994, Smith et al. 1998, Peltonen et al. 2000). In line with this,
1The survey data come from the Swedish database ULF (Survey of Living Standards).
It is conducted on a yearly basis and covers a random sample of about 3000 individuals.
2One exception is Smith (1999), who estimates heterogeneity by income in the eect
of a new illness on wealth and medical expenses. Smith (1999) nds that households
whose pre-illness household income places them above the median income face similar
medical expenses to households with below-median income but larger wealth losses.
2results have shown that highly educated individuals are better at adhering
to medical treatments, such as AIDS and diabetes treatments (Goldman
& Smith 2002). Second, recent literature has shown dierences in access
to medical technologies and treatments according to socioeconomic status
(Rosvall et al. 2008). Third, people of a dierent socioeconomic status may
face dierent incentives to return to the labor market after facing a health
shock, due to the structure of the health insurance and social insurance
systems. Fourth, the extent to which job tasks require good physical health
is likely to vary according to socioeconomic status. Finally, it is likely that
individuals of high socioeconomic status can change occupation more easily
or adjust their work conditions in other ways in response to a health shock.
If substantial heterogeneity exists in the eect of health shocks on labor
market outcomes by socioeconomic status, we believe that this could be an
important part of the explanation for how the socioeconomic gradient in
health arises.3 In this paper, we therefore advance the recent literature
by focusing on socioeconomic heterogeneity in the relative eect of a large
number of dierent types of health shocks on income. In addition, we allow
the eects to vary by age. This is suggested by the cumulative advantage
hypothesis, in which certain mediators of the relationship between socioe-
conomic status and health (e.g. smoking or social capital) accumulate over
the life cycle (see e.g. Ross & Wu 1996, Lynch 2003, Willson et al. 2007).
One would then expect older individuals from lower socioeconomic groups
to be especially sensitive to health shocks, which may then partly explain
why the socioeconomic gradient in health increases in middle age.
For the purpose of our study, we use longitudinal, register-based data
on earnings and hospitalizations for the entire population of Swedish work-
ers. Our data and analytical approach give us a number of advantages.
First, our large sample allows us to estimate heterogeneous eects by both
socioeconomic status and age with great precision. In addition, the large
sample size also allows us to estimate the relative importance of various
types of health shocks in a given population, whereas most previous studies
focus on the impact of one particular health event at a time (see e.g. Dano
(2005) on the eects of accidents in Denmark).
Second, most previous studies on the impact of health shocks on labour
market outcomes treat health events as exogenously given and only a small
3Note also that if the impact of a given health shock is stronger for people of low
socioeconomic status, they would face a double penalty as they already face an increased
risk of experiencing negative health shocks.
3number of recent studies address endogeneity issues(see e.g. Riphahn 1999,
Au et al. 2005, Disney et al. 2006, G omez & Nicol as 2006). The panel struc-
ture of our data allows us to employ panel-data xed-eects techniques and
thereby account for time-invariant factors at the individual level that may
be associated with both underlying health and labor market outcomes, such
as chronic conditions, genes, and early life environment. Our data also allow
us to distinguish between acute and planned hospitalizations. We are thus
able to study the impact of health shocks that were unexpected from the
individual's point of view. Moreover, by comparing the responses across ed-
ucational groups we are able to dierence away any remaining anticipation
eects. This holds if the anticipation eects are similar for individuals with
high and low education, which seems plausible from an inspection of the
raw data. We are thus eectively exploiting a Dierence-in-Dierences-
in-Dierences design, whereby we compare the change in labor earnings
across the treated and control groups with high and low education. We
believe that this design facilitates a causal interpretation of our estimates.
In addition, we perform an extensive set of placebo estimates as well as
a sensitivity analysis using Dierence-in-Dierences matching techniques
(see e.g. Heckman et al. 1997).
Third, our estimates are based on detailed register data on health shocks
taken from the national inpatient hospital registers, while most previous
literature uses data on self-reported health shocks. Using register data
is an advantage, since there is substantial evidence of reporting bias by
socioeconomic status, in that people with higher education and income
report worse health for a given condition (Etil e & Milcent 2006, d'Uva
et al. 2008).4
Fourth, our data allow us to investigate some possible mechanisms that
may give rise to heterogeneity in the impact of health shocks. We are able
4A potential disadvantage of using register data is that dierences may exist in health-
care-seeking behavior across socioeconomic groups. It should be noted that the nominal
fees for health care are very low in Sweden, however, and one should not expect any
dierences for that reason, although dierences may still exist in health-care-seeking
behavior due to dierences in health knowledge across socioeconomic groups. If health
knowledge is lower in the low socioeconomic group, it means that the group of low-
educated individuals seeking care consists of a sample of disproportionally knowledgeable
workers. This would suggest that the eect among the low-educated group is underes-
timated, if the low-educated workers seeking care are also better at taking care of their
health than low-educated workers who should have sought care, but did not. Note also
that the control group would then consist of a number of individuals who did not seek
care when needed, thus further biasing the estimated dierence between the treated and
the controls downward.
4to test the extent to which the heterogeneity arises from dierential access
to health care and treatments, dierences in the severity of health shocks,
dierences in occupations, and dierences in the incentives to return to
work after a health shock across socioeconomic groups. Knowledge about
the mechanisms is of obvious policy interest. For instance, if dierential
access to medical care is the main reason for the observed gradient, then
improved access to health care for low socioeconomic groups would be one
policy option that could be used in order to weaken the gradient.
Fifth, we are able to follow individuals for up to 14 years. This allows
us to consider both the short- and the long-term impact of health shocks.
Since heterogeneity may exist in the long-term impact of health shocks by
socioeconomic status, examining the long-term impact is important.
We start our paper by documenting large, signicant, and long-run
average eects of health shocks on yearly earnings. We then show that these
average estimates mask substantial heterogeneity in the relative impact of
health shocks across socioeconomic groups. In the short run, the eect of
a health shock is much greater for individuals from lower socioeconomic
groups. The dierence is most pronounced for older individuals (aged 50{
59), for whom the eect of low socioeconomic status is more than twice
that for individuals of high socioeconomic status.
Our results also suggest some interesting time patterns. For young
individuals (aged 30{39) the dierence between individuals with low and
individuals with high socioeconomic status decreases with time. At older
ages the picture changes completely. For both those aged 40{49 and those
aged 50{59, the dierence in the eect of socioeconomic status instead
increases with the time since the health shock. This suggests that at old
ages, there are very large dierences in the long-run possibilities to cope
with a negative health shock. Interestingly, we nd similar heterogeneous
eects of socioeconomic status and age across all types of health shocks.
These results are consistent with the idea that the socioeconomic gradient
in health is partly caused by the impact of health shocks on socioeconomic
status. They also oer one explanation for why the socioeconomic gradient
in health widens during middle age.
Besides contributing to the knowledge about the causes of the socioe-
conomic gradient in health, we believe that improved knowledge about
heterogeneity in the impact of health shocks on labor market outcomes has
important policy implications. Such knowledge may point to the possibility
5of targeted eorts towards groups who suer disproportionally from health
shocks. Moreover, the results may provide valuable information for evalu-
ations of the cost-eectiveness of various medical interventions designed to
prevent or cure disease.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, describes our unique pop-
ulation data and provides descriptive statistics. In section 3 we provide
initial graphical evidence on the eects of health shocks. Section 4 presents
our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our main results, and section 6
presents an extended set of robustness analysis. Section 7 tries to explain
the heterogeneous results. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Data
Our data are created by merging three Swedish population register data
sets. The rst register, LOUISE, covers the entire Swedish population aged
16{64 and includes variables such as age, sex, immigration status, marital
status, and yearly labor earnings for the years 1990{2000.5 The second reg-
ister, the Swedish National Patient Register (NPR), includes information
on all inpatient care in Sweden from 1987 onwards. It includes informa-
tion such as the date of admission, whether the admission was acute or
planned, the length of stay, as well as rich medical data including main
and secondary diagnoses (through the International Classication of Dis-
eases, ICD) and detailed information on medical procedures. The third
register is the National Causes of Death register, which records all deaths
of individuals who have permanent residence in Sweden.
We create our treatment group by selecting all the admissions from
the NPR for the period 1992{2000. This allows us to use information
on earnings and health shocks both before and after a health shock that
occurred in a specic year. We further restrict our sample to individuals
who are aged 30{59 when they suered a health shock. The reason is
that a high fraction of those younger than 30 have not yet entered the
labor market and many of those older than 59 are about to retire from the
labor market, which prohibits an analysis of the long-term labor market
5Labor earnings record all gross cash compensation paid by employers. Beside salary,
this includes for instance compensation paid by the employers during the rst 14 days
of a sickness spell and subsistence allowance. Sickness insurance benets paid from
the fteenth sick day onwards, unemployment insurance benets, disability insurance
benets, and other forms of social benets are not included in this measure.
6outcomes. We also restrict the analysis to acute admissions, since we wish
to focus on health shocks that are unexpected from the individual's point
of view.67 For individuals with more than one acute admission during our
observation period, only the rst one is used in the analysis. We use the
international standard and classify all the admissions into 19 major types
of diseases. Of these we choose to focus on the ten most common (in terms
of incidence).8
Since our focus in this paper is on the eect of health shocks on labor
market outcomes, we exclude individuals who are never part of the labor
force. In our main specication, we therefore only include individuals who
participated in the labor force two years prior to the potential shock year.9
We dene labor force participation as having a yearly labor income larger
than one Price Base Amount (between 33,000 SEK (e3,300) and 38,000
SEK (e3,800) depending on the year).10
The control group consists of all the individuals who are part of the
labor force and who potentially could have suered a negative health shock
in each given year but who did not. The number of time periods is restricted
by our observation period of 1990 to 2004. Note that this sampling implies
that an individual who did not suer a health shock may be included in
the control group for more than one year. In order to keep the empirical
analysis manageable from a computational point of view, we randomly
sample 3 percent of the individuals in the control group in each given
6An acute admission is more likely to be unexpected than a planned admission. One
cannot rule out anticipation of acute health shocks, however, and we discuss this in more
detail in the methods section.
7We also exclude admissions related to pregnancies.
8We exclude symptoms, signs, and abnormal clinical and laboratory ndings, not
classied elsewhere (ICD-9: 780{799, ICD-10: R00{R99). This leaves us with infectious
diseases (ICD-9: 0010{139, ICD-10: A00{B99), cancer (ICD-9: 140{239, ICD-10: C00{
D48), mental and behavioral problems (ICD-9: 290{319, ICD-10: F00{F99), diseases
of the nervous system (ICD-9: 320{359, ICD-10: G00{G99), respiratory diseases (ICD-
9: 460{519, ICD-10: J00{J99), heart diseases (ICD-9: 390{459, ICD-10: I00{I99),
diseases of the digestive organs (ICD-9: 520{579, ICD-10: K00{K93), diseases of the
musculoskeletal system and connective tissues (ICD-9: 710{739, ICD-10: M00{M99),
diseases of the genito-urinary system (ICD9: 580{629, ICD-10: N00{N99), and external
accidents (ICD-9: 800{1000, ICD-10: S00{T98).
9We perform a robustness analysis with respect to this restriction, and our results
are insensitive to restricting the sample to those participating in the labor force three
years before the shock year.
10The price base amount is a measure set by the Swedish Government a year at a time.
The amount is calculated based on changes in the consumer price index. The price base
amount has various uses, including ensuring that sickness benets, study support, etc.,
do not decline in value because of an increase in the general price level.
7year.11
2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the fraction of the working popu-
lation aected by a health shock by age and level of education (we present
statistics for 1995). The table reveals a pronounced age pattern, where
health shocks unsurprisingly become more common as people reach old
age. About 3.5 percent experience a health shock in the youngest age
group (30{39), whereas the corresponding gure in the oldest age group
(50{59) is 5.5 percent.
There are large dierences in the prevalence of health shocks by level
of education, however. In the table, we divide the population into two
groups: individuals with a university education (high education) and indi-
viduals without a university education (low education). The latter group is
much more likely to be aected by negative health shocks compared with
individuals with a university education. This pattern holds for all the age
groups and for almost all the types of health shocks. For instance, in the
youngest age group, the likelihood of experiencing at least one health shock
in a given year is about 40 percent larger among the low-educated group
than among the group with high education. A notable exception is cancer,
for which the incidence is the same regardless of educational background.
Table 2 reports sample statistics for a number of background character-
istics, measured one year before the potential health shock. The statistics
show that males, immigrants, and individuals with a child in the household
or who are single are all more likely to experience a health shock. These
patterns hold for all the age categories. As expected, the labor earnings
are greater for those who do not experience a health shock.
3 Graphical analysis
In this section we illustrate some of the most interesting patterns in the
data graphically. This serves as a background for our empirical speci-
cation. Figure 2 shows, for high-educated and low-educated individuals,
11Since we follow the treated and non-treated over a long time period, some of the
individuals in the control group will suer a health shock within our observation window.
In order to handle this we follow the dynamic treatment assignment methods developed
in Fredriksson & Johansson (2008) and include the controls up until the time they suer
their rst health shock.
8the average labor earnings for the treatment and the control group, re-
spectively. Earnings are displayed by time from the potential shock year
(time=0), i.e. the year in which the treated individuals experience a health
shock and the year in which the individuals in the control group potentially
could have experienced a shock.
The gure shows that both the level and the pre-shock trends in earn-
ings dier between the treated and the controls in both the high-educated
and the low-educated group. Clearly, several years before the actual shock,
labor earnings already increase faster in the control group. There also
already seems to be a small decline in labor earnings among the treated
one year before the actual health shock. This suggests that there are some
health shocks that are anticipated and/or aect the individual's labor earn-
ings before they actually force the individual to seek medical help. This also
means that accounting for pre-shock trends and anticipation eects will be
important for our empirical strategy. However, even taking pre-treatment
trends into account, it is still apparent that there is a large decrease, for
both the high-educated and the low-educated group, in the labor earnings
in the year of the negative health shock.
We next graphically display the possible heterogeneous eects. Fig-
ure 3{gure 5 show, for each age group, the ratio between the average
labor earnings for individuals with high education and those for individ-
uals with low education in the treatment and control group, respectively.
Since the average income is higher among individuals with high education
all the ratios are above one.12 For the treated, the earnings ratio jumps up
in the shock year in all the age groups. For the control groups we see no
such jumps. This means that a health shock decreases income relatively
more for individuals with low education compared with individuals with
high education. This captures socioeconomic heterogeneity in the short-
term eect of health shocks. Besides this immediate dierence, the gures
also provide a rst indication of substantial heterogeneity in the long-run
eects. Several years after the health shock the earnings ratio between
treated individuals with high education and those with low education is
still much higher compared with the same ratio in the control group.
Figure 3{gure 5 also have important implications for our empirical
strategy. In gure 2, illustrating average labor earnings, we see important
12One exception is 10 years before the shock year for individuals aged 30{39. This
reects the fact that some individuals with longer university education have not yet
completed their education at this time point.
9dierences in pre-shock trends and anticipation eects. Figure 3{gure 5,
where the focus is on the earnings ratios between mean labor incomes for
high-educated individuals and those for low-educated individuals, there are
no important dierences in pre-shock trends. Before the year of the health
shock, the earnings ratio is very similar between the treatment and the
control group. Moreover, there is no decline in the earnings ratio among
the treated one year before the actual shock. In other words, the pre-shock
trends and anticipation eects are remarkably similar for individuals with
high and low education, so that focusing on heterogeneous eects clearly
mitigates one of the main issues with estimating the eects of health shocks.
As a further illustration, gure 8 in the appendix shows similar gures for
each type of health shock. These gures show that the earnings ratios are
fairly stable before the shock year for almost all types of health shocks,
even for cancer and mental and behavioral diseases. This further supports
the focus on heterogeneous eects.
4 Empirical strategy
The aim of this paper is to estimate the short- and long-run heterogeneous
eects of a negative health shock on labor earnings. To this end, we fo-
cus on acute admissions, since there are good reasons to assume that they
are more or less unanticipated from the individual's perspective. However,
even if acute admissions are unanticipated, the probability of experiencing
an acute admission may be correlated with observed and unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics like labor preferences, early life environment, and/or
underlying ability. We therefore include an extended set of xed eects
as well as controls for dierences in pre-shock trends in all our empirical
models.
Our baseline heterogeneous eects model, for labor earnings for indi-
vidual i in time period t in calendar year z, is:
yizt = t + z + i +
T X
=0






 I(t = )

Di+ (1)




1 Dit + 
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2 (1   Di)t

+ "izt:
We normalize time so that year 0 is the shock year. Di is an indicator
10variable taking the value 1 if the individual suers a health shock in year
0 and 0 otherwise, and ILE is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if
the individual has low education. The coecients of interest are 0;:::;T,
which capture the main eect of a health shock in the shock year, one year
after the shock, and so on, and in particular LE
0 ;:::;LE
T , which capture
the additional eect for individuals with low education. In the analysis we
take age into account by running separate regressions for three dierent
age groups.
This model controls for an extended set of xed eects, including the
timing with respect to the shock year (or potential shock year for the con-
trols), t, calendar time xed eects, z, as well as individual xed eects,
i.13 These xed eects control for changes over time, aggregated changes
in the economy, and all time-invariant factors at the individual level, respec-
tively. We also control for underlying pre-shock trends in labor earnings by
including linear trends that are allowed to vary by both treatment status
and level of education.14
After controlling for xed eects and general pre-shock trends, some
pre-treatment eects may still remain since some health shocks could still
be more or less anticipated and/or already show an eect before the actual
admission. Here, it helps to focus on heterogeneous eects, which compare
the responses to a health shock across educational groups. Our model could
be viewed as a Dierence-in-Dierence-in-Dierences model in which we
compare the change in labor earnings across treated and control groups with
high and low education. If the anticipation eects are similar for individuals
with high and low education, our heterogeneous eects estimate could still
be given a causal interpretation. Based on the gures presented in section 3
this seems highly plausible. Moreover, note that if the anticipation eects
are larger for the low educated, as one may suspect, this will bias our
heterogeneous eect estimates downwards. The important heterogeneous
eects that we document could therefore be seen as a lower bound to the
actual heterogeneous eects.
When comparing the size of the eects for individuals with high and
13In one specication we also include a set of covariates instead of individual xed
eects. All the covariates are measured one year prior to the treatment in order to
handle the potential problem of the control variables being aected by the health shock.
For that reason we cannot include these background characteristics and individual xed
eects at the same time.
14We also run models using quadratic and even cubic trends but the results are in-
sensitive to including more exible controls for trends.
11low education, it is important to keep in mind that the starting level diers
across the groups. This means that even if the eect in absolute numbers
is larger for the high educated, the relative eect on labor income may still
be larger for the low educated. We therefore construct a relative income
measure that sets the individual's current earnings in relation to the average
earnings level among his peers (i.e. those of the same age and the same
level of education). More precisely, we divide the population into six groups
according to age and level of education, and construct a relative outcome
measure by dividing the individual earnings rate by the average earnings
within the group.15
We believe that this extended xed-eects specication, in which we
focus on unexpected health shocks and compare the size of the change in
earnings across educational groups, facilitates a causal interpretation of
our estimates. However, since we rely on observational data we perform
an extensive set of robustness analyses. We therefore: (1) perform placebo
estimates to test for any signicant pre-shock responses two years before
the actual shock (the placebo estimates will be performed jointly and sep-
arately for our ten types of health shocks); (2) use DID matching in the
spirit of Heckman et al. (1997) instead of running xed-eects models; (3)
use detailed data on the number of medical procedures and the number of
diagnoses in order to investigate whether our results are driven by dier-
ences across groups in the severity of the health shocks; (4) estimate models
in which we divide the population into ner educational groups; (5) run
regressions only using the individuals who survive throughout the entire
observation window in order to assess whether our results are aected by
the dierential survival rate across levels of education and age.
5 Results
5.1 Average eects
As a baseline case, table 3 shows estimates of the average eects of a health
shock. The model in column (1) includes basic controls for calendar year
and time xed eects. In model (2) we then add an extended set of observed
15We divide by the average earnings one year prior to the year in which the treated
experience a health shock and the controls potentially could have experienced a health
shock. The reason for this is that this earnings level should be unaected by the health
shocks.
12characteristics.16 Model (3) includes individual xed eects, and model (4)
adds separate linear trends for the treated and non-treated. In all four
specications, we nd large and signicant eects of a health shock on
labor earnings during the year of the health shock. Remember that we use
a relative income measure, so that the coecients should be interpreted in
terms of relative eects. For instance, the estimate of the average eect in
model 4, shown in table 3, suggests that income on average decreases by 9
percent directly after the health shock.
Interestingly, the long-term eects are larger than the short-term eects.
From model 4 in table 3, we see that the eect is 13 percent ve years after
the shock, compared with 9 percent in the shock year. It clearly indicates
that health shocks have sizeable, long-lasting, and economically signicant
eects on labor outcomes.
5.2 Heterogeneous eects by level of education and
age
We now turn to the main purpose of our paper, which is to investigate
heterogeneous responses to health shocks by level of education and age.
Note that in all the models in this subsection, we control for individual
xed eects as well as exible linear trends by treatment status and level
of education. We run separate regressions for the age groups 30{39, 40{49,
and 50{59, and measure the dierence in the eects between low-educated
individuals (no university education) and high-educated individuals (some
university education) using an interaction eect. The results from this
exercise are shown in table 4.
The results reveal important heterogeneous eects. In the year of the
health shock, labor earnings decline by between 5 percent and 6 percent
for the high educated in all three age groups. The eect for the low ed-
ucated is almost twice as large in all the age groups (between 9 percent
and 12 percent). This means that individuals from lower socioeconomic
groups not only suer from more frequent health shocks but also suer
disproportionally from a given health shock.
Beside these clear, short-term dierences in eects across groups, there
are also some interesting time patterns. For the youngest group, the dier-
ence between the high educated and the low educated decreases with time
16We include gender, level and type of education, immigrant status, age, residence
municipality, marital status, and sector of employment.
13after the shock. During the shock year, the eect on earnings is almost 80
percent larger among the low educated. After two years, this dierence has
decreased to 40 percent, and ve years after the shock, the eect is basically
the same for high-educated and low-educated individuals. For individuals
in middle and old age, the time pattern is completely dierent. At these
ages, the dierence in the eect for high-educated and low-educated people
increases with the time since the shock. Five years after the shock, the
eect is almost three times as large among the low educated in the 40{49
group and almost seven times as large in the 50{59 age group.
5.3 Heterogeneous eects by type of health shock
To what extent do the heterogeneous eects dier by type of health shock?
Table 5 presents separate estimates for our ten major types of health shocks.
As in the previous section, we show separate estimates by level of education
and age. The rst, second, and third panels present the eect on yearly
earnings in the shock year, two years after the shock, and ve years after the
shock, respectively. In order to make the presentation of the results more
transparent, we do not report standard errors and only indicate signicance
using stars.
As expected, the main eects dier to quite a large extent across the
types of health shocks. The dierence in the eects between the low edu-
cated and the high educated are, however, very similar across all the types
of health shocks. In order to illustrate this pattern, Figure 6 and Figure 7
display how the heterogeneous eect for the low educated vary by time,
age and type of health shock. These gures show that in the short run,
the low educated experience more severe eects on labor earnings in all
the age categories and for all the types of health shocks. In the long run,
however, the dierence between the high educated and the low educated
in the youngest age group disappears for almost all the types of health
shocks. For the two older age groups we see the opposite pattern, with
an increasing dierence between the high educated and the low educated
over time for most types of health shocks. This means that the pattern




We next proceed by checking the robustness of our main results. We start
by providing some placebo estimates, in which we move the time of the
shock two years back in time, which is before the actual acute admission
took place. If we nd signicant placebo eects, this serves as an indication
that our previously estimated eects do not represent an eect of the actual
health shock but rather the eect of some other time-variant group-specic
characteristic inuencing both the probability of suering a negative health
shock and the decline in labor earnings.
Table 6 presents the placebo estimates of both the main eect and
the interaction eect, which measure the dierence in the eects between
the low educated and the high educated, using our most extended model
specication with individual xed eects and linear trends. These placebo
estimates indicate signicant pre-treatment eects for both the high edu-
cated and the low educated. However, all the pre-shock eects are very
small, and the statistical signicance could to a large extent be explained
by the large sample size. For instance, at ages 50{59, the placebo estimate
of the interaction eect is ten times smaller than the estimate of the eect
in the shock year. Moreover, table 7 shows that most pre-treatment eects
disappear when we also separate the estimates by type of health shock. In
fact, out of 30 estimates of the interaction eect that measure the dier-
ence in the eects between low educated and high educated, we nd only
one that is signicant at the 5 percent signicance level. All these placebo
estimates support our empirical strategy and conrm that it is important
to have a long panel with extended information both before and after the
health shocks. We therefore see no reason to change our main conclusions.
6.2 DID matching
In our main analysis, we use a exible specication with an extended set
of xed eects and controls for dierences in underlying trends. One al-
ternative to this specication is to use a Dierence-in-Dierences (DID)
matching approach (see e.g. Heckman et al. 1997). This provides a non-
parametric estimate of the same parameters as in our main model. Another
potential benet is that the treatment and control groups become balanced
15in terms of covariates. In this subsection, we check the robustness of our
main results when using this alternative specication. More specically,
we rst perform a one-to-one propensity score matching for each shock
year using all our observed covariates.17 For this matched sample we then
compare the dierence in labor earnings two years before the shock with
the labor earnings in the shock year, one year after the shock, and so on.
Table 8 presents DID-matching estimates of the short-run and long-run
eects. These estimates are very similar to our main estimates, including
the increase in the eect over time. If anything the eects are in general
somewhat larger in the short run and somewhat smaller in the long run
compared with the estimates from our main empirical strategy. All in all,
we believe that the results using the DID-matching approach support our
main conclusions.
6.3 Detailed measure of education
In the analysis so far, we focused on heterogeneity in the impact of health
shocks, using only two educational categories: individuals with and without
university education. Do our conclusions change if we use a more detailed
measure of education? To investigate this, we next show estimates using
a more detailed measure of education, for which ve dierent educational
groups are created.18 The estimates of the eects for each educational group
and for each age group are presented in table 9. For all the educational
groups and for all the age groups, except for individuals aged 30{39 with
a long university education, there is a large initial drop in the shock year.
In the long run we see no dierence between the high-school educated and
the university educated in the youngest age group, whereas for individuals
in middle and old ages the dierence between the lowest and the highest
educated widens with time since the health shock. These patterns are again
the same as in our main analysis.
17Note that all the covariates are measured one year before the shock.
18The ve groups are individuals with no high-school education, short high-school
education (two years or fewer), long high-school education (three years), short university
education (two years or less), and individuals with long university education (more than
two years).
166.4 Analysis using survivals
If the fraction that dies during our observation window diers in a system-
atic way across treatment groups, level of education, and age, our estimates
may be biased.19 In order to assess the extent of this potential problem,
we can examine the fraction of individuals who die within our observation
period for the dierent groups. These sample statistics, shown in table 10,
indicate large dierences in the survival rate. Low-educated and old indi-
viduals who experience a health shock are more likely to die. We therefore
re-estimate our model, now only including individuals who survive the en-
tire observation period. The estimates from this exercise are presented in
table 11. Again, we nd that in the long run, the dierence between the
low educated and the high educated disappears for the younger group, but
widens for the two older cohorts. Our conclusions thus remain unaected.
6.5 Severity of the health shocks
Our results so far suggest that individuals with low education have a worse
ability to cope with a health shock. An alternative explanation would be
that individuals with low education experience more intense shocks than
individuals with high education, even though the diagnosis may be the
same. One reason for this would be if the low educated on average wait
longer before going to the hospital after feeling sick, so that the condition
becomes worse once in hospital. If so, we are not really measuring the same
thing across groups with low and high education. In order to test for this
alternative explanation, we use information on the number of diagnoses
and the number of medical procedures as a proxy for the severity of the
health shock. Needless to say, this does not provide a perfect measure, but
it is not far-fetched to assume that a second (or third) diagnosis and the
number of medical procedures (e.g. surgeries) may imply a more severe
health shock.20
Table 12 displays descriptive statistics for the number of diagnoses (in-
cluding the main diagnosis) and the number of medical procedures by level
19Note, however, that if low-educated people are more likely to die following a health
shock, this may result in estimates that underestimate the dierence in eects across
low- and high-educated groups. The reason is that the fraction of "frail" individuals in
the low-educated group will decrease faster over time.
20For the number of medical procedures, the interpretation is somewhat more dicult,
since many medical procedures could be a sign of worse health but could also be an
indicator of better treatment, which potentially could improve the long-term outcome.
17of education and age. We see that the vast majority of individuals only
have a main diagnosis, even though the probability of a secondary diagnosis
increases with age. Most importantly, there are no dierences between the
low educated and the high educated in terms of the number of diagnoses.
Unlike the number of diagnoses, there does not seem to be a clear age pat-
tern when it comes to the number of medical procedures. There are also
only small dierences between the high educated and the low educated.
We also re-estimate our main heterogeneous eects model taking the
number of diagnoses and the number of medical procedures into account.
More specically, we interact our treatment variable with the number of
diagnoses and the number of medical procedures.21 If including these addi-
tional interactions signicantly changes our estimate of the dierence in the
eect of a health shock between the high educated and the low educated
then dierences in the severity of the health shocks explain an important
part of the heterogeneous eects. The results from this exercise are pre-
sented in table 13. For comparison, we also include the baseline results
from table 4. We only report the low-education interaction eect, since the
main eects in the new models now represent the eect for the baseline
category. They are therefore not comparable with our baseline results.
We nd that the heterogeneous eects estimate of the additional eect
for the low educated is distinctly similar across all three models. This
holds for all the age groups and for the short-term as well as the long-term
heterogeneous eects. Even if these measures are imperfect proxies for the
severity of the health shock, these sample statistics and these estimates
show that it is unlikely that the observed heterogeneous eects are purely
an eect of dierences in the severity of the health shock.
7 What explains the heterogeneous eects?
What could then explain the observed heterogeneity in the eects? As
discussed in the introduction, there are several possible explanations. First
of all, the economic incentive to return to work after a health shock is
stronger among the high educated, due to their higher earnings and due
to the fact that, as in most countries, there are maximum benet levels
in the Swedish social insurance. Replacement rates in the Swedish social
21These variables are coded as dummy variables. The number of diagnoses is 1, 2,
3, or  4; the number of operations is 0, 1, 2, or  3. The baseline categories are 1
diagnosis and 0 operations.
18insurance systems are capped at a relatively low ceiling, which means that
low SES people may have weaker incentives to return to work after a health
shock compared with high SES people.22 Hence, high and low educated
individuals may have dierent moral hazard proles. It could also be the
case that the highly educated are able to acquire more information and
handle contact with the health-care system better, allowing them to receive
more appropriate treatment. Moreover, the low educated are to a higher
extent employed in physical/blue-collar occupations. We nd it plausible
that a decline in health complicates the return to work for these individuals
compared with those within white-collar professions due to the character
of the jobs.
Starting with economic incentives, we again note that in the previous
section we found no signicant dierences by level of education in the sever-
ity of the health shocks. Given this fact, and if the dierences in economic
incentives are an important factor, we would expect individuals with high
education to leave the hospital and return to work more quickly. For that
reason we test the economic incentives explanation by including interac-
tion eects between the length of the stay in the hospital (1{5 days, 6{10
days, 11{15 days, 16{20 days, and 21 days). If the heterogeneous ef-
fects change when including this interaction economic incentives oer one
important explanation for our heterogeneous eects estimates.
To test whether the result could be explained by dierences in the
quality of the treatment, we interact the treatment with an indicator for
whether the treating hospital was a university hospital. In Sweden, the
university hospitals usually have the most advanced medical technology.
It is therefore not far-fetched to assume that university hospital status
provides quite a good measure of the quality of the treatment. Finally,
in order to test whether the result could be explained by the sector of
occupation, we include an interaction eect between the individual's sector
22The Swedish sickness insurance provides economic compensation when a worker is
too sick to carry out his or her regular job. This insurance automatically covers all of the
employed workers. The benets in the Swedish sickness insurance are income-related;
the size of the benets depend on the person's wage prior to the sick spell. The insurance
consists of two main benets, sickness benet (SI) and disability benet (DI). The SI
is supposed to cover part of the income loss due to temporary illness. DI compensates
individuals whose work capacity is permanently reduced. The replacement rates have
changed over time, but the rates were capped at a relatively low ceiling throughout
our observed time period (about 25 percent of the workers have an income above the
ceiling).
19of employment the year prior to the shock and the year of the shock.23 If
the heterogeneous eect diminishes or disappears with this specication,
the sector of employment is an important mechanism behind the previously
found results.
The results from these dierent estimations are presented in table 14.
The top, middle, and last panels show the eect on yearly earnings for
the age groups 30{39, 40{49, and 50{59, respectively. For comparison the
baseline results from table 4 are also included in the table. These new
estimates are in most cases similar to the baseline estimates, including the
long-run dierences across age groups. Given this and the fact that the
other results are in line with the baseline estimates, we nd no support
for dierent moral hazard proles, dierences in treatment quality, or dif-
ferences in the sector of employment being able to explain the observed
heterogeneous eects.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we used unique register-based data on the entire population
of Swedish workers to estimate heterogeneity in the eect of health shocks
on labor earnings. Our large-scale register data set covered the entire popu-
lation of Swedish workers over a period of 15 years, which gives our results
an unusually high degree of representativeness. Using panel xed-eects
techniques, focusing on unexpected health shocks, and comparing the out-
comes over time for low- and high-educated workers, we argued that we
came close to estimating the causal impact of health shocks on earnings.
Our results suggest that individuals with low education suer dispro-
portionally from a given health shock, although there were important dif-
ferences in the long-run eects across age groups. For the youngest cohort,
aged 30{39, the dierence between the high educated and the low edu-
cated diminishes over time, whereas the dierence increases over time for
the older cohorts, 40{49 and 50{59. These results are also in line with
the cumulative advantage hypothesis, which states that some mediators of
the socioeconomic status and health relationship (e.g. smoking or social
capital) accumulate over the life cycle (see e.g. Ross & Wu 1996, Lynch
2003).
23We use Statistic Sweden's Svensk N aringsgrensindelning on a two-digit level as an
indicator of the sector of employment.
20The fact that individuals from lower socioeconomic groups suer dis-
proportionally, especially in middle and old age, oers one explanation for
why the socioeconomic gradient in health widens during middle age. Our
results show that at least part of this widening is due to the fact that indi-
viduals in lower socioeconomic groups who experience a health shock lose
a disproportionally large amount of income. This makes them fall further
down in the income distribution, which further strengthens the socioeco-
nomic gradient in health during middle age. Our ndings also support
the arguments by e.g. Case & Deaton (2005a) and van Kippersluis et al.
(2009) that in order to understand the socioeconomic gradient in health,
one needs to take a life-cycle perspective.
What could then explain the heterogeneity in the impact of health
shocks? We have attempted to test whether dierent moral hazard pro-
les, dierences in treatment quality and/or dierent sectors of employ-
ment, and dierential survival across groups are important explanations.
Our estimates suggest that none of these explanations explain a major part
of the observed heterogeneous eects. This may suggest that dierences
in adherence to medical treatment across socioeconomic groups are an im-
portant explanation, although we are unable to test for this in the present
paper. We believe that an improved understanding of the causes behind
heterogeneity in the eects is an important area for future research.
The existence of a large amount of heterogeneity in the impact of health
shocks on labor outcomes is an important insight for policy-makers. As
discussed in the introduction, such heterogeneity means that policy advice
that is based on average estimates may be severely misguided. Our results
show that there may be gains in considering heterogeneous eects, for in-
stance when evaluating new medical technologies and treatments, where
the outcome measures include economic outcomes, such as income. By
considering heterogeneous eects, it may be possible to identify groups in
which the treatments have a benecial cost{benet ratio, whereas the aver-
age eects may mask such heterogeneity in the cost{benet ratio. Targeted
interventions towards such groups may thus lead to a more ecient use of
health-care resources.
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Figure 2: Yearly labor earnings before and after shock year by level of
education
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Figure 4: Ratio between mean labor earnings for high educated shock
(control) and low educated shock (control). Age 40 - 49
26Figure 5: Ratio between mean labor earnings for high educated shock
(control) and low educated shock (control). Age 50 - 59
Figure 6: Dierence between high educated and low educated in the eect
of health shocks. By age and type of health shock
27Figure 7: Dierence between high educated and low educated in the eect
of health shocks. By age and type of health shock
28Table 1: Sample statistics for health shocks













Any Shock (%) 3.90 2.46 4.50 2.94 5.69 4.12
Infectious diseases (%) 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16
Cancer (%) 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.29
Mental & behavioral (%) 0.79 0.27 0.91 0.36 0.73 0.39
Nerve system (%) 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.10
Heart diseases (%) 0.17 0.12 0.48 0.30 1.18 0.77
Respiratory diseases (%) 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.37 0.23
Digestive organs (%) 0.46 0.34 0.57 0.38 0.73 0.53
Musculoskeletal (%) 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.18 0.33 0.22
Genitourinary (%) 0.29 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.25
External accidents (%) 0.74 0.39 0.75 0.47 0.79 0.60
Notes: The table reports the fraction aected by any health shocks and the ten most common
types of health shocks in 1995 (excluding the group symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and
laboratory ndings, not elsewhere classied). High education is dened as having some kind of
university education and low education less than university education.
29Table 2: Sample statistics for background characteristics and earnings
Age 30 -39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Control Shock Control Shock Control Shock
Background characteristics:
Age 34.3 34.6 44.6 44.9 54.0 54.3
Male 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.54
Married 0.45 0.43 0.65 0.60 0.70 0.67
Immigrant 0.096 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.093 0.10
Child in household 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.55 0.18 0.16
Children 0 - 3 0.32 0.27 0.066 0.057 0.0050 0.0055
Children 4 - 6 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.098 0.0093 0.0090
Children 7 - 10 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.030 0.027
Children 11 - 15 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.33 0.097 0.086
Children 16 - 17 0.027 0.036 0.19 0.18 0.079 0.069
Primary and lower sec. edu. 0.010 0.016 0.086 0.11 0.24 0.27
Primary and lower sec. edu. 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.078 0.076
Upper secondary edu. 0.41 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.30
Upper secondary edu. 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12
Post-secondary edu. 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.11
Post-secondary edu. 0.13 0.100 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.12
Postgraduate education 0.0061 0.0039 0.0095 0.0067 0.011 0.0089
Labor earnings:
Employed 0.92 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.94
Mean 166,273 156,713 193,406 177,882 200,434 186,006
P25 108,800 98,200 133,700 118,000 135,200 120100
Median 164,300 155,700 180,500 170,100 185,200 176100
P75 213,800 205,300 231,900 220,900 240,000 230,000
# observations 378,392 434,354 426,466
Note: The table reports background statistics for our analysis sample. The individual is considered
employed if he/she has a job in November each given year. An immigrant is an individual born
outside of Sweden. Earnings is reported in SEK (10 SEK  1 e).
30Table 3: Estimates of the short-run and long-run eects of health shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock year -0.132 -0.119 -0.119 -0.0898
(0.00121) (0.00113) (0.000861) (0.000759)
Shock year+1 -0.149 -0.135 -0.138 -0.100
(0.00135) (0.00127) (0.00105) (0.00102)
Shock year+2 -0.153 -0.140 -0.143 -0.0974
(0.00144) (0.00134) (0.00117) (0.00126)
Shock year+3 -0.171 -0.159 -0.162 -0.108
(0.00150) (0.00141) (0.00125) (0.00151)
Shock year+4 -0.192 -0.182 -0.185 -0.123
(0.00162) (0.00152) (0.00138) (0.00176)
Shock year+5 -0.212 -0.201 -0.203 -0.133
(0.00178) (0.00168) (0.00153) (0.00212)
Shock year+6 -0.233 -0.222 -0.221 -0.145
(0.00193) (0.00182) (0.00164) (0.00242)
Shock year+7 -0.253 -0.243 -0.240 -0.156
(0.00209) (0.00196) (0.00176) (0.00273)
Shock year+8 -0.271 -0.261 -0.256 -0.164
(0.00243) (0.00229) (0.00203) (0.00311)
Shock year+9 -0.282 -0.273 -0.266 -0.166
(0.00266) (0.00250) (0.00219) (0.00340)
Shock year+10 -0.292 -0.285 -0.275 -0.168
(0.00308) (0.00291) (0.00249) (0.00377)
Time variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No
Individual xed No No Yes Yes
Calender time No No Yes Yes
Time xed No No Yes Yes
Linear trends No No No Yes
# observations 17,679,410 16,688,491 17,679,410 17,679,410
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings in the control group.
Controls include gender, marital status, number of kids in dierent age groups, level of education,
immigrant status, age, residence municipality, and sector of employment (2 digits). Standard errors
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent
level, respectively.
31Table 4: Estimates of heterogeneous eects by level of education and age
































(0.00495) (0.00509) (0.00311) (0.00321) (0.00315) (0.00313)







(0.00976) (0.00992) (0.00527) (0.00539) (0.00519) (0.00508)
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual xed Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated
with high respectively low education. High education is dened as some kind of university education
and low education less than university education. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
32Table 5: Estimates of heterogeneous eects by type of health shock, level
of education and age
Age 30 -39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Main Low edu. Main Low edu. Main Low edu.
Shock year
Infectious -0.0137 -0.0426* -0.0299** -0.0361** -0.0234 -0.0471**
Cancer -0.121** -0.0472* -0.111** -0.0539** -0.140** -0.0731**
Mental -0.158** -0.0311* -0.152** -0.00802 -0.142** -0.0128
Nerve system -0.0728** -0.0343 -0.0936** -0.0180 -0.0626** -0.0620**
Heart diseases -0.0382* -0.0569** -0.0807** -0.0623** -0.0984** -0.0664**
Respiratory -0.0198 -0.0197 -0.0379** -0.0155 -0.0376** -0.0404**
Digestive organs -0.0220** -0.0282** -0.0219** -0.0379** -0.0214** -0.0388**
Musculoskeletal -0.0623** -0.0940** -0.0861** -0.0792** -0.0909** -0.0778**
Genitourinary -0.00868 -0.0317** -0.0104 -0.0347** -0.00863 -0.0336**
External -0.0529** -0.0686** -0.0632** -0.0702** -0.0673** -0.0708**
Shock year+2
Infectious -0.0246 -0.0654* -0.0272 -0.0378 -0.0192 -0.0552*
Cancer -0.129** -0.0173 -0.0386** -0.0572** -0.0435** -0.107**
Mental -0.209** -0.0524* -0.147** -0.0654** -0.125** -0.0574**
Nerve system -0.0602 -0.0940 -0.113** -0.0443 -0.0510* -0.120**
Heart diseases -0.0504* -0.0486 -0.0770** -0.0748** -0.116** -0.0950**
Respiratory -0.00605 -0.0524 -0.0373 -0.0321 -0.0222 -0.0841**
Digestive organs -0.0492** -0.0170 -0.00141 -0.0612** 0.0112 -0.0739**
Musculoskeletal -0.0275 -0.0995** -0.0417** -0.0836** -0.0281 -0.109**
Genitourinary -0.106** -0.00413 0.00448 -0.0557** 0.0248 -0.0718**
External -0.0603** -0.0462** -0.0338** -0.0679** -0.0146 -0.0864**
Shock year+5
Infectious -0.0913 -0.0374 -0.0350 -0.0696* -0.0181 -0.122**
Cancer -0.123* -0.0185 0.00386 -0.0821** -0.0484* -0.143**
Mental -0.296** -0.0204 -0.171** -0.0650** -0.0388 -0.0985**
Nerve system -0.199** -0.0160 -0.151** -0.0689 -0.0331 -0.164**
Heart diseases -0.100** -0.0448 -0.110** -0.0809** -0.149** -0.111**
Respiratory -0.0679 -0.0110 -0.0402 -0.0724 0.00855 -0.130**
Digestive organs -0.0938* -0.0110 -0.0139 -0.0848** 0.0229 -0.112**
Musculoskeletal -0.111** -0.0394 -0.0458* -0.110** -0.0280 -0.119**
Genitourinary -0.150** -0.0150 0.0194 -0.104** 0.0743** -0.128**
External -0.116** -0.0280 -0.0441** -0.0789** 0.00497 -0.118**
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings in the non-treated with
high respectively low education. We report estimates for the ten most common types of health shocks.
High education is dened as some kind of university education and low education less than university
education. The models include controls for individual xed eects, calender time xed eect, and
time with respect to the shock year xed eects. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
33Table 6: Placebo estimates by level of education and age
Age 30 -39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Main Low edu. Main Low edu. Main Low edu.
Shock year-2 -0.0128 0.00597 -0.00880 0.00998 -0.00756 0.00624
(0.00332) (0.00346) (0.00218) (0.00223) (0.00195) (0.00193)
Shock year -0.0598 -0.0539 -0.0622 -0.0521 -0.0644 -0.0601
(0.00567) (0.00593) (0.00363) (0.00373) (0.00329) (0.00328)
Shock year+2 -0.0830 -0.0563 -0.0515 -0.0727 -0.0438 -0.0955
(0.00858) (0.00888) (0.00521) (0.00536) (0.00470) (0.00467)
Shock year+5 -0.147 -0.0426 -0.0689 -0.0976 -0.0329 -0.136
(0.0144) (0.0147) (0.00800) (0.00818) (0.00708) (0.00695)
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual xed Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The placebo estimates is created by articially moving back the treatment two years. The
outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated in high and
low education group respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
, and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
34Table 7: Estimates of placebo eects by type of health shock, level of
education and age
Age 30 -39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Main Low edu. Main Low edu. Main Low edu.
Shock year-2
Infectious 0.00777 -0.0159 0.00258 -0.00225 -0.00625 -0.00346
Cancer -0.0142 -0.00635 -0.00949 0.00417 -0.0136 0.00754
Mental -0.00867 -0.00297 -0.0138 0.00800 -0.0151 0.0101
Nerve system -0.0260 0.00722 -0.0102 0.0162 -0.00564 -0.00132
Heart diseases -0.0186 0.0155 -0.0113 0.00989 -0.0105 0.0112
Respiratory -0.0278 0.0227 -0.00225 0.00884 -0.0112 0.0117
Digestive organs -0.00966 -0.000881 -0.00836 0.00700 -0.00297 0.00347
Musculoskeletal -0.0116 0.00133 -0.0174 0.0112 -0.00168 -0.00128
Genitourinary -0.00584 -0.00514 0.00237 -0.00699 -0.00651 0.00473
External -0.0233 0.0181 -0.0115 0.0161 -0.00614 0.00410
Shock year
Infectious 0.00322 -0.0775 -0.0258 -0.0484 -0.0234 -0.0702
Cancer -0.140 -0.0626 -0.123 -0.0627 -0.157 -0.0840
Mental -0.180 -0.0709 -0.189 -0.0148 -0.166 -0.0222
Nerve system -0.0910 -0.0462 -0.108 -0.0102 -0.0693 -0.0818
Heart diseases -0.0454 -0.0532 -0.0938 -0.0608 -0.106 -0.0662
Respiratory -0.0453 -0.00700 -0.0408 -0.0152 -0.0405 -0.0484
Digestive organs -0.0213 -0.0478 -0.0273 -0.0431 -0.0249 -0.0430
Musculoskeletal -0.0617 -0.119 -0.105 -0.0871 -0.0977 -0.0938
Genitourinary -0.00454 -0.0509 -0.00159 -0.0547 -0.00896 -0.0388
External -0.0694 -0.0647 -0.0742 -0.0686 -0.0706 -0.0755
Shock year+2
Infectious -0.00187 -0.112 -0.0218 -0.0543 -0.0190 -0.0862
Cancer -0.155 -0.0382 -0.0549 -0.0694 -0.0667 -0.122
Mental 0.240 -0.107 -0.196 -0.0752 -0.157 -0.0706
Nerve system -0.0840 -0.110 -0.132 -0.0343 -0.0599 -0.146
Heart diseases -0.0597 -0.0440 -0.0945 -0.0730 -0.127 -0.0950
Respiratory -0.0399 -0.0359 -0.0413 -0.0320 -0.0258 -0.0953
Digestive organs -0.0479 -0.0434 -0.00850 -0.0685 0.00668 -0.0796
Musculoskeletal -0.0263 -0.134 -0.0666 -0.0946 -0.0372 -0.131
Genitourinary -0.100 -0.0302 0.0164 -0.0827 0.0245 -0.0788
External -0.0820 -0.0416 -0.0484 -0.0662 -0.0188 -0.0928
Shock year+5
Infectious -0.0601 -0.102 -0.0275 -0.0925 0.0185 -0.164
Cancer -0.159 -0.0476 -0.0185 -0.0994 0.0167 -0.164
Mental -0.338 -0.0963 -0.239 -0.0792 -0.0830 -0.117
Nerve system -0.231 -0.0392 -0.177 -0.0557 -0.0450 -0.200
Heart diseases -0.112 -0.0389 -0.134 -0.0787 -0.163 -0.111
Respiratory -0.114 0.0112 -0.0456 -0.0725 0.00391 -0.146
Digestive organs -0.0918 -0.0475 -0.0234 -0.0951 0.0168 -0.120
Musculoskeletal -0.109 -0.0873 -0.0799 -0.126 -0.0405 -0.150
Genitourinary -0.142 -0.0512 0.0359 -0.141 0.0741 -0.138
External -0.145 -0.0221 -0.0640 -0.0771 -0.000669 -0.127
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings in the non-treated with
high respectively low education. We report estimates for the ten most common types of health shocks.
High education is dened as some kind of university education and low education less than university
education. The models include controls for individual xed eects, calender time xed eect, and
time with respect to the shock year xed eects. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
35Table 8: DID-matching estimates of the short-run and long-run eects of
health shocks
Age 30 -39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Main Low edu. Main Low edu. Main Low edu.
Shock year -0.0269 -0.0745 -0.0631 -0.0402 -0.0805 -0.0272
(0.00429) (0.00433) (0.00320) (0.00329) (0.00332) (0.00339)
Shock year+2 0.0189 -0.141 -0.0357 -0.0806 -0.0612 -0.0634
(0.00584) (0.00590) (0.00366) (0.00377) (0.00382) (0.00393)
Shock year+5 0.0562 -0.217 -0.0314 -0.132 -0.0503 -0.111
(0.00838) (0.00846) (0.00448) (0.00459) (0.00463) (0.00468)
Note: The outcome is the dierence in yearly labor earnings between 2 years before the shock and the
current year divided by the mean earnings among the controls. Standard errors robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Table 9: Estimates of heterogeneous eects using a detailed measure of
level of education
Main Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Age 30 -39
Shock year -0.120 0.0177 0.0921 0.0204 0.130
Shock year+2 -0.151 0.0314 0.117 0.0178 0.157
Shock year+5 -0.209 0.0505 0.160 -0.00412 0.180
Age 40 - 49
Shock year -0.116 0.0137 0.0445 0.0415 0.0798
Shock year+2 -0.131 0.0254 0.0701 0.0655 0.112
Shock year+5 -0.178 0.0408 0.0998 0.0894 0.154
Age 50 - 59
Shock year -0.127 0.0121 0.0481 0.0543 0.0763
Shock year+2 -0.146 0.0210 0.0758 0.0907 0.121
Shock year+5 -0.179 0.0342 0.0990 0.123 0.175
Note: The outcome yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated in
each educational and age group. The excluded category is individuals with no high school education.
Level 2 to 5 is short high school education (2 years or less), long high school education (3 years),
short university education (2 years or less) and individuals with long university education (more than
2 years). The models include controls for individual xed eects, calender time xed eect, and time
with respect to the shock year xed eects. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
36Table 10: Sample statistics on fraction of deaths







Control (%) 0.49 0.29 1.08 0.62 3.09 1.90
Shock (%) 3.25 2.26 7.51 5.49 13.55 9.98
Total (%) 1.74 1.04 4.48 2.88 9.42 6.43
Observations 264,007 107,643 300,638 128,937 317,419 104,937
Note: The table reports the fraction in our analysis sample that dies within the observation period.
Table 11: Estimates of heterogeneous eects using only those that survives
throughout the entire observation period



















(0.00272) (0.00285) (0.00201) (0.00207) (0.00197) (0.00196)












(0.00498) (0.00513) (0.00314) (0.00325) (0.00317) (0.00318)







(0.00982) (0.00509) (0.00533) (0.00547) (0.00527) (0.00520)
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
Individual xed Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated
with high respectively low education. High education is dened as some kind of university education
and low education less than university education. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
37Table 12: Sample statistics on number of diagnoses and medical procedures
Age 30-39 Age 40-49 Age 50-59
Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu. Low edu. High edu.
# of diagnoses
1 77.76 78.58 74.47 75.67 69.99 71.50
2 17.15 16.77 19.11 18.48 21.43 20.68
3 3.719 3.445 4.675 4.238 6.181 5.595
 4 1.373 1.203 1.745 1.620 2.399 2.227
# of medical procedures
0 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.71
1 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.19
2 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.070 0.064 0.066
 3 0.025 0.024 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.036
Observations 119,224 40,582 158,988 59,770 191,954 58,766
Note: The table reports the fraction of the treated in the analysis sample with a certain number of
diagnoses and medical procedures. Number of diagnoses reports includes the main diagnose. Number
of medical procedures counts as registered medical procedures for the current hospitalization.
38Table 13: Estimates of heterogeneous eects controlling for number of di-
agnoses and medical procedures
Shock year Shock year+2 Shock year+5
Low edu. Low edu. Low edu.
Age 30-39
Baseline -0.0431 -0.0415 -0.0220
#diagnoses -0.0426 -0.0409 -0.0213
#operations -0.0426 -0.0404 -0.0206
Age 40-49
Baseline -0.0484 -0.0674 -0.09000
#diagnoses -0.0477 -0.138 -0.0886
#operations -0.0483 -0.0661  -0.0881
Age 50-59
Baseline -0.0544 -0.0876 -0.125
#diagnoses -0.0533 -0.0861 -0.124
#operations -0.0546 -0.0871 -0.125
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual f.e Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time f.e Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated with
high respectively low education. Each row reports results from one specication. The specication
with number of diagnoses includes an interaction eect between our treatment eect and number of
diagnoses number of diagnoses (1, 2, 3, or  4), and the number of operations specication includes
and an interaction between the treatment eect and number of medical procedures (0, 1, 2, or  3).
High education is dened as some kind of university education and low education less than university
education. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  and  indicate
signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
39Table 14: Estimates of heterogeneous eects controlling for length of stay,
type of hospital and occupation
Shock year Shock year+2 Shock year+5
Low edu. Low edu. Low edu.
Age 30-39
Baseline -0.0431 -0.0415 -0.0220
length of stay -0.0417 -0.0402 -0.0202
university hosp. -0.0433 -0.0414 -0.0214
occupation -0.0426 -0.0465 -0.0356
Age 40-49
Baseline -0.0484 -0.0674 -0.09000
length of stay -0.0172 -0.0658 -0.0880
university hosp. -0.0490 -0.0677 -0.0900
occupation -0.0578 -0.0813 -0.112
Age 50-59
Baseline -0.0544 -0.0876 -0.125
length of stay -0.0506 -0.0840 -0.122
university hosp. -0.0553 -0.0881 -0.125
occupation -0.0616 -0.0892 -0.115
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual f.e Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time f.e Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The outcome is yearly labor earnings divided by the mean earnings among the non-treated with
high respectively low education. Each row reports results from one specication. Each specication
includes an interaction between the health shock indicator and either the length of stay in the hospital
(1-5 days, 6-10 days, 11-15 days, 16-20 days, and  21 days), admission to University hospital or
sector of employment (two digit level) and shock, respectively. High education is dened as some
kind of university education and low education less than university education. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  and  indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent
level, respectively.
40Table 15: Estimates of heterogeneous eects on social insurance usage
Age 30 - 39 Age 40 - 49 Age 50 - 59
Main Low edu. Main Low edu. Main Low edu.
SI
Shock year 0.274 0.0633 0.327 0.0231 0.340 0.0307
(0.00293) (0.00324) (0.00251) (0.00276) (0.00257) (0.00272)
Shock year+2 0.00640 0.0769 0.0361 0.0270 0.0468 0.0229
(0.00323) (0.00355) (0.00285) (0.00309) (0.00301) (0.00311)
Shock year+5 -0.0545 0.109 -0.0186 0.0157 -0.0371 0.00842
(0.00454) (0.00494) (0.00399) (0.00429) (0.00410) (0.00418)
DI
Shock year 0.00126 0.00266 0.00436 0.00343 0.00687 0.00768
(0.000370) (0.000462) (0.000499) (0.000600) (0.000774) (0.000838)
Shock year+2 0.0120 0.0144 0.0258 0.0211 0.0465 0.0449
(0.000819) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00125) (0.00152) (0.00169)
Shock year+5 0.0254 0.0337 0.0514 0.0467 0.0819 0.0711
(0.00131) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00197) (0.00238) (0.00258)
UI
Shock year -0.0119 0.0183 -0.00508 0.00966 -0.00483 0.00582
(0.00170) (0.00188) (0.00115) (0.00126) (0.000989) (0.00100)
Shock year+2 -0.00980 0.0176 -0.00111 0.00610 -0.00728 0.00191
(0.00252) (0.00281) (0.00177) (0.00194) (0.00155) (0.00158)
Shock year+5 0.000328 -0.000417 0.00921 -0.0130 -0.00718 -0.00813
(0.00359) (0.00402) (0.00250) (0.00275) (0.00220) (0.00223)
Time variables Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
Individual f.e Yes Yes Yes
Calendar time Yes Yes Yes
Time f.e Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes
Note: The outcome is the take-up of sickness insurance, disability insurance and unemployment
insurance, respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  and 
indicate signicance at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
41A Appendix
Figure 8: Ratio between mean labor earnings for high educated shock
(control) and low educated shock (control). By type of health shock
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